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Abstract
We study the incentives to share private information ahead of con-
tests, such as markets with promotional competition, procurement
contests, or R&D. We consider the cases where rms have (i) inde-
pendent values and (ii) common values of winning the contest. In
both cases, when decisions to share information are made indepen-
dently, sharing information is strictly dominated. With independent
values, an industry-wide agreement to share information can arise in
equilibrium. Expected e¤ort is lower with than without information
sharing. With common values, an industry-wide agreement to share
information never arises in equilibrium. Expected e¤ort is higher with
than without information sharing.
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1 Introduction
Competing rms can often commit to share relevant information with their
competitors. Exchange of information not only takes place in joint ventures
or cartels; one benet of joining an industry association is better access to
industry data. The incentives to share information have been extensively
studied in the literature on imperfect competition. Competition in some
oligopolistic markets is, however, best described as a contest or an all-pay
auction, and the incentives to share information ahead of a contest appear
to have not yet been explored. To date, the main focus of the literature has
been on the implications of whether rmsdecision variables are strategic
substitutes or strategic complements. In the all-pay auction, however, these
notions do not t because the best replies may be nonmonotonic, involving
either marginal overbidding, or spending zero e¤ort.1 The aim of this article
is to analyze this case.
The strategic interaction between rms in many markets has the charac-
teristics of a contest. This is particularly true of markets with intense ad-
vertising or promotional competition (Schmalensee 1976, 1992), and in R&D
races. Lichtenberg (1988) stresses the importance of design and technical
competitionsfor public procurement and points out that these competitions
are best understood as contests. Dasgupta (1986) uses the all-pay auction
with complete information as a model of R&D races and research tourna-
ments. In a similar structure, Kaplan et al. (2003) analyze rmsinnovation
activities when potential gains are endogenous. See Konrad (2009) for a
survey. This article examines a popular type of contest, often used as a
benchmark in the contest literature: an all-pay auction.2 The all-pay auction
1In our analysis with continuous strategy spaces, formal best responses may not exist
due to the open-endedness problem arising with discontinuous payo¤ functions. When
referring to best replies in this context we are thinking of either " best replies or best
replies in nite approximations of the continuous strategy space.
2The all-pay auction captures the notion that, conditional on expenditures, exogenous
shocks do not play a signicant role in determining a contests outcome. Contests with
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has been studied under a wide range of assumptions concerning the informa-
tion possessed by competitors (Weber 1985; Hillman and Riley 1989; Baye
et al. 1993, 1996; Amann and Leininger 1996; Krishna and Morgan 1997;
Morath and Münster 2010). Here we build on these results to investigate
information sharing.
The literature on information sharing in oligopoly is extensive and we do
not attempt to survey it here. Early contributions include Ponssard (1979),
Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982), Vives (1984), and Gal-Or (1985). Raith
(1996) presents a fairly general model that encompasses many of the known
results; Vives (1999, Chapter 8) contains an overview. Most closely related to
our article are studies of information disclosure in R&D competition, going
back to Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983). Gill (2008) and Jansen (2008)
are recent contributions, and also include overviews of the literature. Our
contribution to this literature is to focus on the two-player all-pay auction
structure and on the incentives to reveal ones value of winning the contest
to ones competitor. We also study the social e¢ ciency of the decision to
share information and nd conditions under which a legal prohibition of
information sharing or, alternatively, a requirement to share information, is
welfare improving.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Firms
receive private information about the value they derive from winning the
contest. If private information pertains to some rm-specic characteristic
such as the cost structure, a model with private values may be appropriate;
Section 3 considers this case.3 On the other hand, if the information is about
some circumstances which are common to the rms such as demand con-
exogenous noise, such as the Tullock (1980) or Lazear & Rosen (1981) models, generally
require su¢ cient noise to ensure pure-strategy equilibria in the complete information game.
Alcalde and Dahm (2008) and Che and Gale (2000) have recently shown that contests with
"small" amounts of exogenous noise share many of the same properties as all-pay auctions.
3At the end of Section 3, we also consider the case where rms receive private infor-
mation about their marginal cost of e¤ort in the contest rather than about the value of
winning (see also Moldovanu and Sela 2001, 2006).
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ditions, we have common values; we study this case in Section 4. Sections
2 to 4 assume, following most of the literature, that the decisions on infor-
mation sharing are binding commitments taken ex ante, before rms receive
private information. To assess the robustness of our results, Section 5 dis-
cusses interim information sharing, where decisions on information sharing
are taken after rms have received their private information. We summarize
our ndings and discuss extensions in Section 6.
2 The model
There are two rms i = 1; 2: At stage 1, each rm decides whether or not
to share information. In the literature, there are two approaches concerning
how to model these decisions. We will describe each in detail below. Between
stage 1 and stage 2, each rm receives a private signal si about its value vi of
winning the contest. We assume that the signals s1 and s2 are independent
draws from a cumulative distribution function F with support [sl; sh], 0 
sl < sh: We assume that F is continuously di¤erentiable. In the case of
private values analyzed in Section 3 below, each rms value of winning is
equal to its signal, vi (s1; s2) = si. In Section 4, we investigate a common
values environment in which each rms value of winning equals a nonnegative
continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, and symmetric function of the
two signals, v (s1; s2).4
4Our assumption of independent signals is not without loss of generality. However, as
demonstrated by Krishna and Morgan (1997), even in the standard symmetric environment
of Milgrom and Weber (1982), a¢ liation is not su¢ cient to insure the existence of an
increasing (symmetric) equilibrium bidding function in the all-pay auction. Krishna and
Morgan (1997) provide a su¢ cient condition on the product of the value function and the
conditional density for such a symmetric equilibrium to exist. Roughly speaking, for a
well-behaved value function this condition requires that for all values of si the density of
si conditional on s i does not change too abruptly in s i . Radhi (1994) has provided
examples demonstrating that highly correlated signals may lead to perverse nonmonotonic
bidding functions. Although we believe our results are robust to some degree of a¢ liation,
it is clear that more general results for arbitrary a¢ liated signals would be di¢ cult to
obtain.
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In stage 2; rms choose their outlays or e¤orts xi 2 R+: The higher e¤ort
wins; ties are broken randomly. Thus the probability that rm i wins is given
by
pi =
8><>:
0; if xi < xj;
1
2
; if xi = xj;
1; if xi > xj:
Conditional on the signals (s1; s2) and the e¤orts (x1; x2) ; rm is expected
prot is pivi (s1; s2)  xi:5
As noted above, there are two main approaches to information sharing
in the literature: the decision whether or not to share information can be
either unilateral, or a bilateral agreement. In the rst approach, decisions
to share information are taken simultaneously and independently. These
decisions are binding commitments. Hence, if rm i has decided to share
information, rm j 6= i also learns the signal si before the e¤orts are chosen;
otherwise, si is private information to rm i: In an alternative approach, the
rst stage decisions on information sharing are treated as an industry-wide
agreement, where a rm shares its information before stage 2 if and only if
the other rm does so as well. Here, in stage 1 both rms simultaneously
indicate whether they would like an industry-wide agreement on information
sharing. If both indicate that they want it, then all information is shared.
If at least one rm indicates that it does not want to share, then no rms
information is shared. Note that in both approaches, sharing information
can be thought of as providing hard evidence that fully reveals the realization
of ones signal.6
Finally, we assume that social welfare depends on the rms expected
prots. Moreover, the rmse¤orts may be socially desirable in themselves.
5Our analysis applies directly to the case where each rm has an identical increasing
cost of e¤ort function c (xi) ; i = 1; 2: In this case the bid can be redened as zi = c (xi)
and all relevant calculations can be carried out with the transformed bid zi:
6It will become clear that, in both approaches, our ndings are robust to a sequential
timing of the decisions on information sharing where rm 1 decides rst, and rm 2 decides
after having observed the decision of rm 1.
5
For example, if xi is innovative e¤ort, it may provide positive spillovers to
the rest of the economy. Thus, we assume that conditional on the signals
(s1; s2) and the e¤orts (x1; x2) total welfare is
W (s1; s2;x1; x2) =
X
i=1;2
(pivi (s1; s2)  xi) + 
 X
i=1;2
xi
!
:
Here,  is a parameter that expresses the social value of the e¤orts not
directly captured by the rms in the industry. If  > 0 the e¤orts provide a
socially valuable externality not captured by the industry and if  < 0 this
externality is negative.
Throughout, we analyze whether equilibrium information sharing is so-
cially e¢ cient. In particular, we study whether prohibiting information shar-
ing, or forcing the rms to share information, increases welfare.
3 Private values
In this section, we assume that each rms value of winning the contest
coincides with its signal, vi (s1; s2) = si for i = 1; 2. That is, each rm is
privately informed about the value it derives from winning, and this value is
independent of the other rms value.
3.1 Industry-wide agreements
We begin the analysis with the simpler case of industry-wide agreements.
Here we only have to consider the symmetric situations in which either both
rms share their information, or both keep their information secret. The
corresponding continuation equilibria are well known.
Both rms share information If both rms share their information,
the resulting subgames have complete information, and the all-pay auction
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has a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies (Hillman and Riley 1989; Baye,
Kovenock, de Vries 1996).7 Without loss of generality, let s1  s2; which
corresponds to v1  v2. Firms play the following mixed strategies:
B1 (x) =
s2   s1
s2
+
x
s2
for x 2 [0; s1] ;
B2 (x) =
x
s1
for x 2 [0; s1] :
To see this is an equilibrium, note that the expected prot of rm 1 from an
e¤ort x1 2 [0; s1] equals
x1
s1
s1   x1 = 0:
A higher e¤ort leads to a higher probability of winning, which is just out-
weighed by the increased costs; thus rm 1 is indi¤erent between all these
e¤ort levels. Moreover, choosing an e¤ort x1 > s1 is suboptimal, because it
leads to negative expected prots. Similarly, rm 2 is indi¤erent between all
x2 2 (0; s1] ; because each such x2 gives the same expected prot:
s2   s1
s2
+
x2
s2

s2   x2 = s2   s1:
To summarize, the expected prot of a rm i equals max fsi   sj; 0g. As
rms decide on information sharing before they know their own value, this
decision is based on the ex ante expected prot, i.e. the expectation at the
beginning of stage 1. Firm is ex ante expected prot from an agreement to
share information is equal toZ sh
sl
Z si
sl
(si   sj) dF (sj) dF (si) : (1)
7There is a trivial technical complication if sl = 0: In the event that si = 0 < sj ; rm i
has a strictly dominant strategy to choose zero e¤ort, hence rm j would like to choose the
smallest strictly positive e¤ort, which does not exist in a continuous strategy space. To
x this, we assume that in case si = 0 < sj and xi = xj = 0; rm j wins with probability
one. A similar comment applies to Lemma 1 below.
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No rm shares information If no rm shares information, then stage
2 is characterized by two-sided incomplete information. The equilibrium is
in increasing strategies: a rm that receives a signal s chooses e¤ort
 (s) =
Z s
sl
tdF (t) : (2)
To see that this is an equilibrium, consider the expected prot of rm i;
given that rm j follows this strategy.8 Suppose rm i chooses an e¤ort of
xi 2
h
0;
R sh
sl
tdF (t)
i
. Equivalently, rm i bids according to  but as if it had
received a signal z such that xi =  (z) : The expected prot of rm i equals
Pr ( (sj) <  (z)) si    (z) = F (z) si  
Z z
sl
tdF (t)
=
Z z
sl
(si   t) dF (t) :
As the integrand is positive if and only if si is greater than t; the optimal
choice is z = si; and hence xi =  (si) as in (2).
A rms interim expected prot, conditional on si; equals
F (si) si  
Z si
sl
tdF (t) =
Z si
sl
(si   sj) dF (sj)
and ex ante expected prot isZ sh
sl
Z si
sl
(si   sj) dF (sj) dF (si) : (3)
Comparing (1) and (3) shows that expected prot when both rms share
information is equal to expected prot when no rm shares information.9
8The equilibrium was rst derived in Weber (1985). Uniqueness follows from Amann
and Leininger (1996).
9This payo¤ equivalence has rst been shown in Morath and Münster (2008), who use
a di¤erent method of proof than the one given here. The result holds not only for the
all-pay auction but also for the rst-price auction and the second-price auction. It is also
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Proposition 1 Consider information sharing as an industry-wide agree-
ment, where a rm shares information if and only if the rival shares infor-
mation. With private values, both information sharing and no information
sharing can arise in equilibrium. Firmsprots are identical in the two cases.
Expected e¤orts are higher without information sharing.
Proof. The equivalence of rmsprots in the two cases has been shown
above. Therefore, if rm i proposes to share information, rm j is indi¤erent
whether or not to agree. Thus both cases can arise in equilibrium. It remains
to consider the implications for expected e¤orts. Suppose no rm shares
information and denote expected e¤ort of rm i by E
 
xNNi

: Then
E
 
xNNi

=
Z sh
sl
 (si) dF (si) =
Z sh
sl
Z si
sl
tdF (t) dF (si) :
Now suppose both rms share information. Conditional on s1 and s2; ex-
pected e¤ort of rm i is equal to sj=2 if si > sj; and equal to s2i = (2sj) if
si < sj: Therefore, the ex ante expected e¤ort of rm i equals
E
 
xSSi

=
Z sh
sl
Z si
sl
sj
2
dF (sj) +
Z sh
si
s2i
2sj
dF (sj)

dF (si) :
The di¤erence is
E
 
xNNi
  E  xSSi  = Z sh
sl
Z si
sl
sj
2
dF (sj) dF (si) 
Z sh
sl
Z sh
si
s2i
2sj
dF (sj) dF (si)
=
Z sh
sl
Z sh
sj
sj
2
dF (si) dF (sj) 
Z sh
sl
Z sh
si
s2i
2sj
dF (sj) dF (si) ;
where the second equality uses Fubinis theorem. Renaming the variables of
more general than presented here in that it does not rely on the assumption of only two
players. Moreover, the result also holds for discrete probability distributions.
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integration in the rst term by exchanging i and j; we get
E
 
xNNi
  E  xSSi  = Z sh
sl
Z sh
si
si
2

1  si
sj

dF (sj) dF (si) > 0:
Proposition 1 indicates that an industry-wide agreement to share infor-
mation may occur in equilibrium, but depresses e¤ort. In the context of a
procurement contest or an R&D race, for example, where it might be ex-
pected that e¤ort has positive spillover e¤ects, banning industry-wide infor-
mation sharing would result in a Pareto improvement. As prots of the rms
are unchanged, but the e¤orts are higher, when  > 0; welfare is higher. The
amount by which the e¤orts increase is exactly equal to the gain in alloca-
tive e¢ ciency: without information sharing, the rm with the higher value
wins the contest with probability one, whereas with information sharing the
equilibrium is in mixed strategies and thus the rm with the lower value
sometimes wins.
3.2 Independent commitments to share information
In this section, we turn to the two stage model, where rms independently
decide whether or not to commit to share information. Here, if exactly one
rm shares its information, an asymmetric situation arises at the contest
stage: the signal, and hence the value, of one rm is common knowledge,
whereas the value of the other rm is its private information.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that rm 1 has committed to share
information, whereas 2 has committed not to share information. The equilib-
rium will then exhibit a mixture of the properties of the equilibria in the two
symmetric cases discussed above. Firm 1; whose value is common knowledge,
will randomize continuously according to a cumulative distribution function
which we denote by B1: Firm 2, on the other hand, will choose e¤ort as an
increasing function of its privately known signal. Firm 1 may choose zero ef-
10
fort with a positive probability, which we denote by B1 (0) 2 [0; 1). Similarly,
there may be a signal s0 such that rm 2 chooses zero e¤ort for all signals
s2  s0. Hence F (s0) 2 [0; 1) is the ex ante probability that rm 2 chooses
an e¤ort of zero.10
Lemma 1 (Morath and Münster 2010) Suppose that only rm 1 shares its
private information. In the unique equilibrium of stage 2, rm 2 plays the
following pure strategy:
2 (s2) =
(
0 for s2 2 [sl; s0)
(F (s2)  F (s0)) s1 for s2 2 [s0; sh]
: (4)
Firm 1 randomizes according to
B1 (x1) =
R x1
0
1
 12 (z)
dz +B1 (0) for x1 2 [0; (1  F (s0)) s1] : (5)
B1 (0) and s0 are uniquely dened bymin fB1 (0) ; F (s0)g = 0 and B1 (2 (sh)) =
1.
Proof. Here we only show that this is an equilibrium; for the proof of
uniqueness see Morath and Münster (2010). Consider rm 1 and suppose
that rm 2 follows the strategy in (4). Firm 1s prot from an e¤ort x1 2
(0; (1  F (s0)) s1] equals
Pr (2 (s2) < x1) s1   x1 = F

F 1

x1 + F (s
0) s1
s1

s1   x1 = F (s0) s1:
Thus rm 1 is indi¤erent between all these e¤orts. Higher e¤orts are clearly
suboptimal, because they might be lowered without decreasing the chances
10There is a similar trivial technical complication here as in footnote 7 above. If rm
1 has the signal s1 = 0 and shares this information, then rm 2 would like to choose the
smallest strictly positive e¤ort, which does not exist in a continuous strategy space. To
x this, we assume that rm 2 wins whenever x1 = x2 = 0: This tie-breaking rule also
ensures that, in case B1 (0) > 0; it is optimal for the smallest type of rm 2 to choose
2 (sl) = 0; even if sl > 0:
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to win. Whenever s0 > sl, an e¤ort of zero is also suboptimal, because it
involves the risk of losing the contest even in case that rm 2 chooses zero
e¤ort. When s0 = sl, any x1 2 [0; s1] gives a prot of zero and thus rm 1 is
indi¤erent between these e¤orts.
Now consider rm 2 and suppose that rm 1 follows (5). The prot of
rm 2 from an e¤ort x2 2 [0; (1  F (s0)) s1] equalsZ x2
0
1
 12 (z)
dz +B1 (0)

s2   x2:
Because  12 is strictly increasing, the prot of rm 2 is strictly concave in
x2. The maximum is thus unique and described by the rst order condition
1
F 1

x2+F (s0)s1
s1
s2   1  0; x2  0;
together with the complementary slackness condition. If s0 < s2, we have an
interior solution with
x2 = F (s2) s1   F (s0) s1:
Otherwise, an e¤ort of zero is optimal.
It remains to show that B1 (0) and s0 are uniquely determined. Note rst
that rm 1 wont choose an e¤ort that is higher than the highest possible
e¤ort of rm 2, and thus B1 (2 (sh)) = 1. With the substitution 
 1
2 (z) = s,
the boundary condition B1 (2 (sh)) = 1 can be written asZ sh
s0
s1
s
dF (s) +B1 (0) = 1: (6)
The rst term is continuous and strictly decreasing in s0; moreover, it would
vanish if s0 were equal to sh: It follows that B1 (2 (sh)) = 1 has a unique
solution that fullls min fB1 (0) ; F (s0)g = 0.
12
As in the case where both rms share information, the distribution of
e¤orts of rm 2, considered from the point of view of rm 1; is a uniform
distribution, with possibly a mass point at zero. Moreover, the slope is just
1=s1: For rm 1; a higher e¤ort leads to a greater chance of winning, which
is just outweighed by the higher cost. Thus rm 1 is indi¤erent between the
e¤orts it randomizes over.
It is straightforward to see that, in equilibrium, at least one of the
mass points B1 (0) and F (s0) must be zero. Suppose to the contrary that
B1 (0) > 0 and F (s0) > 0: Then rm 1 chooses an e¤ort of zero with strictly
positive probability. But choosing a su¢ ciently small but strictly positive
e¤ort " gives a higher prot: the probability of winning increases discretely
at an arbitrarily small cost, contradicting equilibrium. Thus, at least one
of the mass points is zero. Whether rm 1 or rm 2 has a mass point at
zero depends, in general, both on the distribution function F and on the
realization of the signal s1.
For future reference, note that (6) together with min fB1 (0) ; F (s0)g = 0
implies s0 < s1 for all s1 > sl: To understand the economics behind this,
suppose to the contrary that s0  s1: Then rm 2 has zero prot for any
signal s2  s1; and rm 1 has a prot of F (s0) s1; which is strictly positive
since s0  s1 > sl  0: Therefore, the e¤ort of rm 1 can be no greater than
(1  F (s0)) s1. But this implies that, whenever s2 > (1  F (s0)) s1; rm 2
can guarantee itself a strictly positive prot by bidding slightly more than
(1  F (s0)) s1; contradiction. Hence s0 < s1:
In contrast to the case of industry wide agreements, information sharing
cannot arise in equilibrium when decisions on information sharing are taken
independently.
Proposition 2 Consider independent decisions on information sharing. With
private values, sharing information is strictly dominated.
Proof. We show that, for any si > sl; sharing information is strictly worse
than not sharing if the rival rm shares information (step 1), and similarly
13
if the rival rm does not share information (step 2). (If si = sl; the prot of
rm i is zero if it shares information.) Therefore, the ex ante prot of rm i
is strictly higher if i does not share information.
Step 1. Suppose that rm j shares its information. We rst argue that
for all realizations of si and sj; the prot of rm i is weakly lower if it shares
information than if it does not. If rm i shares its information, given si
and sj its prot equals max f0; si   sjg : Suppose that rm i does not share
information. Any e¤ort xj > sj is strictly dominated for rm j: Moreover,
rm j chooses xj = sj with probability zero. Therefore, by choosing xi = 0
if si  sj; and xi = sj if si > sj; rm i can guarantee itself a prot of
max f0; si   sjg ; and its equilibrium prot cannot be lower.
It remains to show that rm is interim expected prot is strictly higher
if it does not share information. Suppose i does not share information. As
argued above, for any sj > sl the corresponding critical signal s0 is strictly
smaller than sj:11 Thus, for any si > sl; if sj happens to be equal to si,
the corresponding s0 is strictly smaller than si; hence rm i chooses strictly
positive e¤ort and has a strictly positive prot. By continuity, this is still
true if sj 2 (si; si + ) for some  > 0: On the other hand, if rm i shares
information, it gets zero prot whenever sj  si: It follows that whenever
sj 2 [si; si + ) ; rm i s prot is strictly higher if rm i does not share
information. Together with the last paragraph, this implies that rm is
interim expected prot is strictly higher if it does not share information.
Step 2. Now suppose that rm j does not share information. We focus
on an interim perspective and show that given any signal si > sl; the prot
of rm i is strictly higher if it does not share information.
If rm i with signal si does not share information, its prot isZ si
sl
(si   sj) dF (sj) : (7)
11Here s0 is dened in Lemma 1, replacing subscript 1 by j and subscript 2 by i: Remem-
ber that here rm j shares information, whereas in Lemma 1 rm 1 shares information.
Similarly, the rm that does not share is rm i here and rm 2 in Lemma 1.
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If rm i shares information, by Lemma 1 (replacing subscript 1 by i and
subscript 2 by j) rm i gets a prot ofZ s0
sl
sidF (sj) (8)
which is equal to the probability that j has a signal lower than s0 and thus
chooses zero e¤ort, multiplied by is value si. If s0 = sl; we are done because
the prot of i equals zero if it shares its information, whereas the prot of i
is strictly positive if i does not share its information. Therefore, suppose in
the following that s0 > sl: Then the critical signal s0 is determined such thatZ sh
s0
si
s
dF (s) = 1: (9)
As argued above, s0 < si. For notational convenience, let  denote the
di¤erence between the prots (7) and (8):
 :=
Z si
sl
(si   sj) dF (sj) 
Z s0
sl
sidF (sj) : (10)
Straightforward manipulations show that
 =
Z s0
sl
(s0   sj) dF (sj) +
Z si
s0

si   sj + s0   s0 si
sj

dF (sj)
 
Z si
sl
s0dF (sj) +
Z si
s0
s0
si
sj
dF (sj) :
Rewriting the last term and using (9) givesZ si
s0
s0
si
sj
dF (sj) = s
0
Z sh
s0
si
sj
dF (sj) 
Z sh
si
si
sj
dF (sj)

= s0

1 
Z sh
si
si
sj
dF (sj)

:
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Thus
 =
Z s0
sl
(s0   sj) dF (sj) +
Z si
s0
(sj   s0) si   sj
sj
dF (sj)
+s0

1 
Z si
sl
dF (sj) 
Z sh
si
si
sj
dF (sj)

:
The rst and the second term are both strictly positive because sl < s0 < si,
and the third term is nonnegative. Thus  > 0:
If an industry-wide agreement on information sharing is not possible,
there is a unique equilibrium where rms do not share their information. In-
dependently of the rivals decision, they prefer to keep their own information
secret.12
The astute reader will note that in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
we demonstrate that the result from Proposition 1 on the equality of prof-
its with and without industry-wide information sharing and the result from
Proposition 2 that information sharing is strictly dominated under indepen-
dent decisions, carry over to an environment in which information sharing is
considered at the interim stage, after rms receive their signals. Here, in the
asymmetric situation where only rm i shares its signal, the interim prot of
rm i is increasing in si, and one might conjecture that a rm with a high
signal may have an incentive to share its information. However, the interim
prot in the case where no rm shares its information is also increasing in
ones own type. In fact, if F is the uniform distribution on the unit interval,
 (the di¤erence in interim prots given in equation (10)) is monotonically
12Proposition 2 goes through if the signals are drawn from a discrete distribution func-
tion and the number of possible signals is strictly larger than 2. The case of a binary
distribution is an exteme case in the sense that, given that rm j does not share informa-
tion, is prot are the same whether or not i shares information, and information sharing
is only weakly dominated (for the equilibrium of the all-pay auction see Konrad 2009).
However, if j does share information, i is strictly better o¤ if it keeps its information
secret. Thus, there are three equilibria: one equilibrium where both rms do not share
information, and two equilibria where exactly one rm shares information and the other
does not share.
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increasing in si: the higher ones signal, the higher is the benet from keeping
it hidden. In general, however,  is not monotone.13 We examine the issue
of interim information sharing further in Section 5.
Because the results from Propositions 1 and 2 carry over to the interim
stage, our results on information sharing also apply to a model where both
rms have the same constant value of winning v > 0, and rm i0s cost of
e¤ort equals  (si)xi; i = 1; 2; where  (si) is a positive and decreasing func-
tion of the signal si: This arises because, at the interim stage, dividing prots
by (si) is a positive a¢ ne transformation of prots that leaves behavior un-
der uncertainty invariant. This generates an all-pay auction with prize value
v= (si) and cost of e¤ort xi, i = 1; 2; for which the results that prots are
equal with and without industry-wide information sharing and that informa-
tion sharing is strictly dominated under independent decisions continue to
hold. Consequently, these properties hold at the interim stage for the original
game and therefore at the ex ante stage as well, so that our results on ex
ante information sharing policies continue to hold.
4 Common values
In the previous section, we assumed that the rmsvalues vi are private.
In many environments, however, it is reasonable to assume that the values
of winning depend on the other rms signal as well. This section studies
common values where
v1 (s1; s2) = v2 (s1; s2) = v (s1; s2) :
We assume that v is nonnegative, continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increas-
ing in s1 and s2, and symmetric, i.e. v (s1; s2) = v (s2; s1) for all (s1; s2).
13To give an example where  is not monotone, suppose that signals are distributed
according to F (s) = s3 on the unit interval.
17
4.1 Industry-wide agreements
Both rms share information Here, at the contest stage, the value
of winning v is commonly known. As before, under complete information,
there is a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies. With v1 = v2 = v, we have
complete rent dissipation, and expected prots are zero.
Conditional on (s1; s2), the sum of the expected e¤orts of both rms
is equal to v (s1; s2) : The sum of ex ante expected e¤orts is equal to the
expected value of winningZ sh
sl
Z sh
sl
v (s1; s2) dF (s2) dF (s1) :
No rm shares information Here, rm i knows si but not sj: Krishna
and Morgan (1997) have shown that there is a symmetric equilibrium in
strictly increasing strategies xi =  (si) where
 (si) =
Z si
sl
v (t; t) dF (t) :
To see that this is an equilibrium, suppose rm j follows the strategy . If i
chooses its e¤ort according to  but as if its signal was z; it gets a prot ofZ z
sl
(v (si; t)  v (t; t)) dF (t) :
As v is strictly increasing in its arguments, the integrand is strictly positive
for all t < si and strictly negative for all t > si, and it is optimal for i to
choose z = si.14
Ex ante expected prot of rm i is equal toZ sh
sl
Z si
sl
(v (si; t)  v (t; t)) dF (t) dF (si) > 0; (11)
14Due to our assumption that the signals are independent, the condition for existence
of the equilibrium given in Krishna and Morgan (1997) is automatically fullled.
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and hence higher than if both rms share their information. We summarize
this argument in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Consider industry-wide agreements to share information about
a common value where rm i shares its information if and only if rm j does.
Then there will be no information sharing in equilibrium.
Contrary to the case of private values of winning, the rmsprots are
higher if they do not share their information with their rival, and thus an
agreement on industry-wide information sharing can not arise in equilibrium.
4.2 Independent commitments to share information
We now consider information sharing with independent decisions. As above,
this necessitates considering the case where only one rm shares its informa-
tion. Again, the equilibrium exhibits properties of each of the two symmetric
cases, where either both rms share information or no rm does.
Lemma 2 Consider the case of a common value v (s1; s2). Suppose the sig-
nal of rm 1 is commonly known, whereas s2 is private information of rm
2: In equilibrium, rm 2 plays a pure strategy
2 (s2) =
Z s2
sl
v (s1; t) dF (t) : (12)
Firm 1 randomizes according to
B1 (x1) = F
 
 12 (x1)

: (13)
Proof. Consider rm 1 and suppose it chooses an e¤ort x1 2
h
0;
R sh
sl
v (s1; t) dF (t)
i
:
Higher e¤orts are obviously suboptimal because they can be lowered without
changing the probability of winning. Let z =  12 (x1) : The prot of rm 1
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equals
Z  12 (x1)
sl
v (s1; s2) dF (s2)  x1 =
Z z
sl
v (s1; s2) dF (s2)  2 (z) = 0:
Therefore, rm 1 is indi¤erent between all these e¤orts.
Now consider rm 2. Its prot is
B1 (x2) v (s1; s2)  x2 = F
 
 12 (x2)

v (s1; s2)  x2:
Suppose rm 2 chooses e¤ort as if its signal were z: Then it gets
F (z) v (s1; s2)  2 (z) =
Z z
sl
(v (s1; s2)  v (s1; t)) dF (t)
As the integrand is strictly positive whenever t < s2; and strictly negative
whenever t > s2; the optimal choice is z = s2:
If exactly one rm shares its information, ex ante expected e¤orts are the
same for both rms. In fact, the distribution of the e¤ort of the rm that
shares information,
Pr (x1  z) = F
 
 12 (z)

;
is the same as the distribution of the e¤orts of the rm that does not share
information:
Pr (x2  z) = Pr (2 (s2)  z) = F
 
 12 (z)

:
Using this characterization of equilibrium in the contest when only one
rm shares information, we can derive the incentives for information sharing
with independent decisions.
Proposition 4 Consider the case of common values and independent deci-
sions about information sharing. Then, sharing information is strictly dom-
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inated.
Proof. Suppose rm i shares information. If rm j also shares information,
it earns zero expected prots, as has been argued in Section 4.1. If j does
not share information, i randomizes its contest e¤ort as in (13) and j chooses
an e¤ort as in (12). Hence, given si, rm js expected protZ sj
sl
(v (si; sj)  v (si; t)) dF (t)
is strictly positive for any sj > sl: A fortiori, ex ante expected prot is strictly
positive, and the best reply is not to share information.
Suppose that rm i does not share information. If rm j shares informa-
tion, j randomizes its contest e¤ort as in (13). Its expected prot is zero. If
it does not share information, it getsZ sj
sl
(v (sj; t)  v (t; t)) dF (t)
which is strictly positive for all sj > sl. Thus j strictly prefers not to share
information.
Note that the proof of Proposition 4 also establishes that sharing infor-
mation is dominated from an interim perspective. Hence, if the decisions on
information sharing were taken only after having received the signal, there
is still no incentive to share information, just as in the case of private values
(see the discussion following Proposition 2).
We now compare expected prots and e¤orts across the di¤erent infor-
mation structures. Due to the common value, both rms value the prize
identically, so there cannot be an allocative ine¢ ciency. Ex post, the sum of
prots is
2X
i=1
(piv (s1; s2)  xi) = v (s1; s2) 
2X
i=1
xi;
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and the sum of prots and e¤orts is always v (s1; s2). Consequently, the sum
of expected prots and expected e¤orts has to be the same in all information
structures. Therefore, the ranking of expected e¤orts is just the opposite of
the ranking of expected prots.
If both rms share information, expected prots are zero; otherwise the
sum of expected prots is strictly positive. Therefore, expected e¤orts are
highest if both rms share information. The comparison between the remain-
ing cases, however, depends on the function v:15
Remark 1 Suppose that rm j does not share information. Whenever v is
supermodular, js prot is higher if i shares information than if i does not
share. If v is modular, js prot is the same in both cases. If v is submodular,
js prot is lower if i shares information than if i does not share.
Recall that is expected prot is zero whenever i shares information.
Thus, whenever v is modular or submodular, (1) the sum of expected prots
is lower, and (2) the sum of expected e¤orts is higher if exactly one rm
shares information than if no rm shares information. If v is supermodular,
expected e¤orts may be higher if no rm shares information.
In the common values environment, rms prefer to keep their information
secret, whether or not an industry wide agreement on information sharing is
possible. The ranking of the expected e¤orts shows that they are highest if
both rms share their information with their rival. Therefore, contrary to the
case of private values, agreements on information sharing about a common
value can be desirable from a welfare point of view if the investments in the
contest are socially valuable. In fact, if the value of the e¤orts to society is
higher than their cost to the rms (i.e.  > 1), then a legal requirement to
share information is welfare improving.
15The proof is in the appendix. Kim (2008) obtains a similar result for the rst price
auction with common values.
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5 Interim information sharing
The result that, with independent decisions, there will be no information
sharing does not only hold if this decision has to be taken before the rms
receive their signals. Because the proofs of Propositions 2 and 4 consider an
interim perspective, rm i prefers not to share information for each possible
signal si > sl. Thus rms do not have an incentive to reconsider their decision
and inform the rival in case they have, for instance, a high value of winning
the contest.
Moreover, if the decisions on information sharing were taken only after
having received the signal, results corresponding to Propositions 2 and 4 can
be obtained. To be more precise, consider the following game of interim
information sharing:16
1. Firms privately receive their signals.
2. Firms decide independently whether or not to share their signals. As
above, sharing information means providing hard evidence that fully
reveals the realization of ones signal.
3. The contest takes place.
We argue that this game has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where no
rm ever shares its information. In this equilibrium, the beliefs of a rm
about the signal of its rival are as follows. If rm i does not reveal its signal,
consistency of beliefs with strategies requires that rm j believes that si is
distributed according to the ex ante distribution F: If rm i deviates and
reveals its signal, the belief of j is pinned down by the hard evidence, that
is, rm j knows si.
16For a variety of winner-pay auctions, Benoît and Dubra (2006) study related problems
and show that results may depend on the ne details of the information structure. They
also present a general full disclosure result (Theorem 1); however, the assumptions of this
result are not fullled in our all-pay auction setting.
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Now suppose that rm j never reveals its signal. Consider whether rm
i wants to reveal its signal on stage 2: This is exactly the comparison we
used in the proofs of Propositions 2 (step 2) and 4: for any si > sl; rm i is
strictly better o¤ if it does not reveal its signal. This shows that the game
of interim information sharing has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where no
rm ever shares its information.
The game has, however, also a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with full
disclosure. This can be supported by o¤-equilibrium beliefs of the rival that
make him bid very aggressively. With common values, suppose that, if rm i
does not share its information, rm j believes that si is equal to the highest
possible signal sh: Then winning seems very important to rm j and thus
it bids aggressively. Consequently rm i cannot make a positive prot, no
matter what its true signal may be. Recall that, upon revealing its signal,
rm i also makes zero prot. Thus all types of rm i are indi¤erent between
revealing and not revealing. With private values, a similar construction can
be given by assuming that the o¤-equilibrium belief of rm j is that rm
i has drawn exactly the same signal as rm j itself. Again, this makes
j bid aggressively, and rm i is exactly indi¤erent between revealing and
not revealing its information. Thus, whereas this is an equilibrium with full
disclosure, it is not a strict equilibrium; in fact any type of any rm is exactly
indi¤erent.
6 Conclusion
This article considered incentives to share information ahead of competition
in markets that are described by an all-pay auction. We rst considered
private values. We found that, with industry-wide agreements, rms are
indi¤erent between sharing and not sharing information. Thus, an industry-
wide agreement on information sharing may emerge in equilibrium. Aggre-
gate e¤orts, however, are higher without information sharing, and a ban on
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industry-wide agreements on information sharing is a Pareto improvement
whenever e¤ort generates positive spillovers outside of the contest as, for
example, may be the case in a procurement contest or a R&D race. How-
ever, with independent decisions whether or not to share information sharing
information is strictly dominated.
Second, we considered a common values framework, where the true value
of winning is a continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, and symmetric
function of the rmsprivate signals. Here, e¤orts are highest if both rms
share information. Information sharing will not arise in equilibrium - rms
are strictly better of if they do not share information, no matter whether
they decide individually, where information sharing is a strictly dominated
strategy, or consider an industry-wide agreement. When the e¤ort gener-
ates positive spillovers outside of the contest, information sharing may be
ine¢ ciently low. Thus, whereas there may be too much information sharing
with private values, there may be too little information sharing with common
values.
We conclude by discussing extensions and possible avenues for future re-
search. In the private values case, the exact equality of prots when both
rms share information and when no rm shares (Proposition 1) is robust
to an extension to more than two rms, but it hinges on the assumptions of
symmetrically distributed signals and risk neutrality of the rms. One of the
main messages of our analysis, however, namely that with private values an
industry-wide agreement on information sharing may arise, is reinforced if we
modify these assumptions. In the private values case, for constant or decreas-
ing absolute risk aversion, it can be shown that each rm is strictly better
o¤ if both rms share their information than if no rm does.17 Moreover, it
is possible to give examples with asymmetrically distributed signals where
17The proof extends the analysis of the all-pay auction under complete information
and risk aversion from Hillman and Samet (1987) to the case where the contestants have
unequal values, and uses results from Matthews (1987) and Fibich et al. (2006). Details
are available upon request.
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both rms strictly prefer an industry-wide agreement.18 Nevertheless, when
decisions on information sharing are taken independently, rms do not have
a strict incentive to share information if the rival shares. Here, our result
that, by keeping its information hidden, a rm can guarantee itself at least
the prot it gets under complete information, generalizes to risk aversion, to
ex ante asymmetries, and to more than two rms. Moreover, in the case of
common values, prots are zero if all rms share information. This is also
true with risk aversion, ex ante asymmetries, or more than two rms, and
thus we expect no industry-wide agreement to share information. Similarly,
whith common values and independent decisions, there cannot be a strict
incentive to share information if all other rms share their information. A
full analysis of independent decisions, however, seems to be more di¢ cult
when we change the model in one or the other direction, and we leave it for
future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Remark 1
We compare the interim prot of rm 2 in the asymmetric setting where only
rm 1 shares information, which we denote by SN2 (s2) (the rst superscript
indicates rm 1 does share information, the second says that rm 2 does
not shares information), with the interim prot of rm 2 if no rm shares,
18Let, for example, rm is signal be uniformly distributed on [0; hi], i = 1; 2, where
h1 = 1 and h2 > 1. Then, rm 2 prefers an industry-wide agreement, and rm 1 will agree
if and only if h2 > 2. Details are available upon request.
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denoted by NN2 (s2) : We have
SN2 (s2) =
Z sh
sl
Z s2
sl
(v (s1; s2)  v (s1; t)) dF (t) dF (s1)
NN2 (s2) =
Z s2
sl
(v (s2; t)  v (t; t)) dF (t)
=
Z s2
sl
(v (t; s2)  v (t; t)) dF (t)
where the last line uses the symmetry of v: If s2 = sl; rm 2 chooses an e¤ort
of zero in both cases, and
SN2 (sl) = 
NN
2 (sl) = 0:
Moreover,
@
@s2
SN2 (s2) =
Z sh
sl
Z s2
sl
@v (s1; s2)
@s2
dF (t) dF (s1)
= F (s2)
Z sh
sl
@v (s1; s2)
@s2
dF (s1)
= F (s2)Es1

@v (s1; s2)
@s2

;
and
@
@s2
NN2 (s2) =
Z s2
sl
@v (t; s2)
@s2
dF (t)
= F (s2)Es1

@v (s1; s2)
@s2
js1  s2

:
Hence
@
@s2
SN2 (s2) 
@
@s2
NN2 (s2)
= F (s2)

Es1

@v (s1; s2)
@s2

  Es1

@v (s1; s2)
@s2
js1  s2

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which is strictly positive if @v(s1;s2)
@s2
increases in s1: It follows that SN2 (s2) >
NN2 (s2) for all s2 > sl whenever v () is supermodular. Similarly, SN2 (s2) <
NN2 (s2) for all s2 > sl if v () is submodular, and SN2 (s2) = NN2 (s2) for
all s2 > sl if v () is modular.
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